UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF VERMONT ANNESSA LEWIS) VS) CASE NO: 1:14-CV-205 BELLOWS FALLS CONGREGATION OF) JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, BELLOWS FALLS, VERMONT, INC., ET AL) MOTION HEARING BEFORE: HONORABLE J. GARVAN MURTHA SENIOR JUDGE APPEARANCES: DEVIN MILES STOREY, ESQUIRE The Zalkin Law Firm, P.C. 12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 301 San Diego, California 92130 Representing The Plaintiff JEROME F. O'NEILL, ESQUIRE Gravel & Shea, P.C. P.O Box 369 Burlington, Vermont 05402 Representing The Plaintiff

DATE: January 5, 2016

TRANSCRIBED BY: Anne Marie Henry, RPR
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(Appearances Continued)

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(The Court opened at 10:35 a.m.)
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               THE CLERK:
                           This is civil docket number 14-cv-205,
     Annessa Lewis versus Bellows Falls Congregation of the
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     Jehovah's Witnesses of Bellows Falls, Watchtower Bible and
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     Tract Society of New York, Inc. and Norton True. Also we're
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     here in In re: Christian Congregation of Jehovah's
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     Witnesses.
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               Present in the courtroom representing the
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    plaintiff are Attorneys Jerome O'Neill and Devin Storey.
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     Also in the courtroom representing defendants are Attorneys
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     Jennifer McDonald, Pietro Lynn, Walter Judge, Junior,
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     Barbara Blackman and Ian Carleton. Representing defendant
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     True are Attorney Will Kraham and Mr. Anthes.
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               THE COURT: And we are hearing various motions.
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               THE CLERK: And we are here on a motion hearing,
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     exactly.
              Excuse me.
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                          Mr. Lynn, do you have something to say
               THE COURT:
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     or --
                          Well, obviously it was more in the way
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               MR. LYNN:
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     of question and suggestion. I know there are a series --
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               THE COURT: Well, why don't you let me go first.
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                          Glad to. Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. LYNN:
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               THE COURT: Welcome all, first of all. I see a
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    number of very prominent attorneys from Vermont and
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     elsewhere I guess. I was just reviewing the new amendments
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to the civil rules, which call for, it seems, more cooperation among parties and the Court. And also calls for scheduling orders and that sort of thing, which, at least I don't follow the rules I quess, in the sense that we don't have these conferences early on. And maybe I should change. I don't know about the other judges in Vermont, whether they are following the rules in the sense that it calls for conferences and hearings instead of just filing the discovery, the discovery schedule, which is then approved by the Court. And then there's no real contact normally between the judge and the parties until something develops. And I quess this is a development. I am going to deal with all the motions this morning. And I'll take them in the order that I reviewed them. And, frankly, I spent a lot of time reviewing these, which is the first time in a while that I've spent so much time going through discovery and trying to figure out whose asking for what and what objections there are and why. So, certainly I will hear some arguments from all of you on the various motions. I'm not saying that the time will be limited, but it may be limited depending on how long you go at it. Again, bear in mind, that I spent, I don't know how many hours, going through all these things and have some preliminary ideas of how I'm going to rule.

So, you want to say something else other than, Mr. 1 2 Lynn? 3 MR. LYNN: No, Your Honor. I was, what I was 4 going to ask the Court is given the volume of motions and 5 what seems to be at least a limited amount of time, how the 6 Court wanted to apportion the time as between the two 7 parties and which motions would go first. 8 Well, I've decided which ones go THE COURT: 9 first. And, frankly, I will apportion the time. If I feel 10 people are speaking too long I'll tell them. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LYNN: 12 Okay. So, again, I've put these in THE COURT: 13 order perhaps the way that I think they should be dealt 14 with. You may not agree with that, but the first motion I'd 15 like to hear is the plaintiff's motion to compel Watchtower 16 to provide documents requested in plaintiff's first request 17 for production. 18 And that includes, as I see it, document 69, which was filed on October 13 of last year. And that included 19 20 69-1, which was the specific verbatim listing of each item 21 sought, which is dated September 16. And also include 22 document 69-3 which is, they are all exhibits for the plaintiff's motion, but that is Watchtower's objections and 23

69-4, which was or is defendant's, defendant Watchtower's

responses to requests for production. And also includes

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1 privilege log dated September 16 of '15. And then there is a document 8-4, which is 2 3 Watchtower's opposition to the motion and 92, which is 4 plaintiff's reply. 5 In addition, on December 17 of last year, there 6 was a letter from Mr. Lynn which enclosed certain documents 7 for review by the Court. And those were documents two 8 through four, five through seven, eight through 10 and 17 9 through, 17 and 18 on the privilege log by Watchtower. 10 So, just as a preliminary statement, it appears to 11 me anyway that the documents at issue in this motion are 12 either all listed or 99 percent listed on the privilege log. 13 So if I'm wrong, let me know that, but the ruling that I 14 will make will concern the privilege log and whether or not 15 it should be turned over or not, whether the documents 16 should be turned over. 17 I am seriously contemplating and will likely order 18 that there be a confidentiality agreement between the parties, some, if not a majority of these documents. 19 20 I'll just give you that preliminary statement, that 21 preliminary thought. 22 So, I guess Mr. O'Neill you are the plaintiff. And it's your motion. If you want to go ahead. I don't 23 24 know, maybe Mr. Zalkin who is going to argue it?

Devin Storey is here with me, Your

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MR. O'NEILL:

1 Honor. And, Mr. Storey is --2 THE COURT: Mr. Storey. I'm sorry. MR. O'NEILL: 3 That's all right. He is going to 4 arque the substantive motions related to the various motions 5 to compel that were filed by our side. 6 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, Mr. Storey? MR. STOREY: Good morning, Your Honor. 7 8 THE COURT: Good morning. 9 MR. STOREY: May it please the Court. So with 10 respect to this motion, it seems that the central objection 11 that Watchtower has made is the clergy penitent privilege or 12 the religious privilege. And there are three topical 13 reasons why the assertion of privilege fails. 14 And the first is on a broad level. Watchtower 15 has, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have a very regimented way 16 of responding to childhood sexual abuse allegations. 17 are policies and practices in place. And because of those 18 policies information of this type is distributed within the 19 organization to various people and can never satisfy the 20 requirements of confidentiality required for application of 21 the privilege. So on a broad level documents of this type 22 cannot satisfy the privilege. 23 Secondarily, on a case specific level, with 24 respect to Norton True, none of the documents can satisfy 25 the requirements of confidentiality or the requirement that

there was a spiritual -- a communication seeking spiritual advice.

This is not a circumstance where a penitent came to a clergyman and made a confession. This is a circumstance where a person's accused of a heinous wrongdoing. He was called before the elders and he denied doing anything. So there is no communication seeking spiritual advice.

And, third, on a document by document specific level, going through these requests it's clear that some of these documents don't contain any communication from a penitent to a member of the clergy and others, pardon me, Your Honor, there's been no effort to establish the actual underlying privacy or confidentiality of any communication from a member — to a member of the clergy.

So looking first generally at the religious privilege, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person made to a member of the clergy in his professional character as a spiritual adviser. And a confidential communication is made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication. It is the privilege proponent's obligation to demonstrate application of the privilege and their burden.

So on the broad level I mentioned before, there are a number of ways that a member of the clergy can learn of a molestation allegation. A victim can come forward and make a complaint seeking that some action be done, a parent can do the same. Some other witness could observe something, come to the elders and say, hey, I think you better look into this, this person's a threat. There could be a call from the police or a custody battle or a newspaper article. A spouse of a molester could come forward and state some concerns.

In any of those circumstances, someone's coming forward and asking that action be taken. It's not a communication to an Elder seeking spiritual advice. And that's a fundamental problem in the showing that's been made by the defendants. There's no showing whatsoever as to why these particular documents or these particular communications contained within these documents were brought to the attention of the Elders.

There's no showing that there was a request for spiritual advice. And because of that, the assertion of privilege fails regardless.

The molestation complaints within the Jehovah's Witnesses are subject to, regardless of the reason that someone came forward to an Elder, are subject to potentially broad disclosure.

Now, when a complaint comes in the first thing that Elder does who gets it is call the legal department and ask for legal advice. Am I a mandatory reporter? If so, the person calls the police. If not, the person still has complete discretion to call the police if they so choose.

Now, the next thing that happens is the Elders will convene and they'll discuss the allegations. They'll assign two people to investigate. Those Elders will go out, they'll talk to the accused, they'll talk to the accuser, they'll speak to anyone else with relevant information, come back, report to the body of Elders. And if there's enough evidence they'll form a judicial committee, which involves a third Elder. They'll go out and they'll meet with the accused again and determine what type of censure to impose.

After that there's the possibility that the accused may appeal. If the accused appeals another Elder called the circuit overseer who oversees 20 to 25 congregations of Jehovah's Witnesses in a geographic area will be contacted. He'll assemble an appeals committee from three separate Elders in different congregations within that circuit to review the material. Then the Service Department at Watchtower will be contacted.

So, once the complaint comes in there are any number of individuals who may be given access to the allegedly confidential information. And in the event that

the person is dis-fellowshiped or excommunicated they can seek reinstatement. And that may happen four or five years down the road. And if it does, you might have different Elders in the congregation who are going to be given access to all the materials to determine whether that person is eligible for reinstatement.

The person moves to another congregation, pardon me, the person moves to another congregation a letter of introduction will be written. And, again, that same allegedly confidential information will be disseminated to others.

So these policies just don't allow for sufficient confidentiality of documents or statements dealing with childhood sexual abuse to qualify for privilege.

Now, on the case specific level dealing with

Norton True, here we have a circumstance where my client's

mother came forward and made a complaint. She came forward

to the Elders and said Norton True molested my daughters.

And at that point there was investigation, there were

discussions, there were communications. But in the whole,

pardon me, Norton True didn't initiate that. He didn't come

forward seeking spiritual advice. Instead, he got called

before the Elders. He answered their questions with

denials.

So in that circumstance there was no communication

seeking spiritual advice, which is a direct requirement of the statute and which is missing. So, again, on that level, there is no confidentiality and no privilege.

And then in looking at the particular documents at issue, a number of those documents are what are called S2 forms. That's documents, two, three, four, eight and 18. And those documents are, they are administrative documents where the local congregation will send Watchtower a report and say, hey, we think that, you know, member one and member two and member three meet the requirements for appointments as a Ministerial Servant or Elder.

And in putting that together what will happen is the Elders will put down their thoughts. Say, this person seems to meet the requirements because. Those are all the impressions of the individual Elders stating why the person meets the requirements or not. There is no communication from the individual to the Elders that's being communicated on to Watchtower. So in the absence of a communication to a member of the clergy there's no privilege.

Documents 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 all involve molestation allegations. And for the reasons discussed those, pardon me, those don't meet the requirements of the statute.

So for all those reasons the clergy penitent privilege or the religious privilege isn't applicable to

these documents or this type of document.

Now, the defendants also argue that there is a First Amendment privilege or entitlement to refuse to produce documents in discovery. And they base that primarily on a case called Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese versus Milivojevich. In that case we got a circumstance where Milivojevich had been the bishop of the diocese. He had been removed. And was suing to be reinstated. And it was effectively a -- it was a lawsuit over whose the bishop and who has control of the diocese's assets.

And the Court in that case said, look, we can't get involved with that. That's a Supreme Court case. We can't get involved with that. We can't determine whose the proper bishop of a diocese. That's not for us.

But those cases and the cases that similarly determine that the church shouldn't get -- the Court shouldn't get involved in church property disputes have been distinguished in cases of this nature repeatedly by courts that have had to deal with this issue.

And the courts have said, look, this isn't, you know, a discovery issue like we've got here. It doesn't decide any point of dogma. It doesn't decide whose going to be a bishop. It doesn't decide who can be a member or who can't. All it does is require that certain documents in the possession of the defendant be produced. And that doesn't

in any way implicate the First Amendment. So that the strong weight of authority that we cited in our briefs indicates that there is no legitimate First Amendment issue here.

Other than that, the defendants have argued that there are third party privacy issues at issue here. And the glaring one is the privacy rights of any individual victims that are identified in these documents. And we recognize that that exists. And, you know, we'd recommend that the protective order that the Court had mentioned earlier would be an adequate way of protecting those interests.

To the extent that there are others that the defendants have indicated have privacy interests, such as Mr. True presumably, also the Elders that were involved with the congregations involved, any interests there are certainly subordinate to the plaintiff's need to get these documents and to get the information in the defendant's possession.

So if the Court were to issue a protective order I think all of those concerns could be adequately addressed while plaintiff would still be entitled to the information that she needs.

THE COURT: Well, the normal procedure is for the parties to put together a protective order for approval by the Court. So you think that's possible?

MR. STOREY: Well, with the Court's comments this morning that a protective order is appropriate to your eyes, yes, I think we can do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you agree that the documents you seek are all on the privilege log or is there more?

MR. STOREY: There are some other documents, there are other categories we've requested. For instance, there's a type of document, it's called a Body of Elders Letter.

And these are letters that Watchtower sent out. They are policy letters that go out to the congregations and are to be followed.

And we've asked for those. And we had butted heads against the defendant a little bit on this in that they had offered to produce certain of them if we agreed to a protective order. We had, A., not wanted a protective order and, B., we had wanted a greater sample than they have offered.

Effectively what these documents are -- some of them are going to deal specifically with child molestation or how a judicial committee works. And the defendants have offered to produce those subject to a protective order. But others are going to deal with Watchtower's ability to control the congregation and what happens at the congregation level, which ultimately we feel is going to be very relevant to an agency issue that's going to come up

1 later in this case. And that's the reason that we've 2 requested those documents. 3 So, are those mentioned, I'm looking 4 at the motion to compel Bellows Falls Congregation. 5 Unfortunately, I don't have it attached to the Watchtower 6 one. But it appears to be request number 39, which talks about July 1, 1989 letter to all bodies of Elders and so 7 8 forth? 9 MR. STOREY: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: So, that's all except for those items 11 that are on the privilege log? There's a couple other things. 12 MR. STOREY: No. 13 We had requested that Watchtower produce a document called 14 Branch Organization. And Branch Organization, and it's also in the moving papers, this is a document that's used by all 15 16 branches of Jehovah's Witnesses to govern how they function 17 at the branch level, which is effectively the national 18 level. And we've requested this information primarily, 19 20 A., as it relates to the question of control for an agency 21 issue later. And, B., for punitive damages. Ultimately we 22 are going to claim in this case that the governing body of 23 Jehovah's Witnesses who formulated their policies acted 24 maliciously and recklessly. And what we expect to see from

the defendants is that the governing body is not in any way

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     related to Watchtower. We think this document will
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     establish contrary. So we've requested that.
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               THE COURT: Do you know what request that is?
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               MR. STOREY: Pardon me?
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               THE COURT: Do you know which request that is?
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               MR. STOREY: I can get that for you in just a
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     second, Your Honor. And then the, the other thing that's in
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     the motion is also the subject of the protective orders,
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     which are the institutional awareness documents. So we had,
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     that was request 65 and 67.
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               THE COURT: Yes, okay. That's right.
               MR. STOREY: So we can take care of that on the
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     other motion.
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               THE COURT:
                           Exactly.
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               MR. STOREY: So that's --
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. STOREY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you. Mr. Lynn?
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.
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               THE COURT: Good morning.
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                          Bear with me for just a second.
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     Judge, I gather, I don't want to misspeak, but I gather that
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     I'm here now to talk about the documents in the privilege
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     log, and we'll get to the other documents that were the
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     subject of the motion for a protective order when that issue
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comes up?

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. LYNN: Thank you, Your Honor. Well, Judge, I, of course, listened to the argument that was being raised around the issue of the privilege. And I would remind the Court that in applying a Vermont privilege it's not a bad starting point to look at what the privilege is called. It's called a religious privilege. And that's under Rule 505.

And so, Judge, let me back up for a moment and talk about, first of all, what this case is about. The claim here in this case is that Annessa Lewis sometime in either 1992 or '93 was inappropriately touched on the chest at Norton True's house, not in the Kingdom Hall, not in connection with any Jehovah's Witness sponsored event. And that there was disclosure of this some years later, '94, '95.

And upon disclosure that certain documents were created, some of those documents are now in the Court's possession. The claims for liability that remain after the motions to dismiss are two-fold. The first is that Mr. True was the agent of Watchtower. The second is that somehow there was, and the allegation in the complaint for negligent undertaking was that there were policies and procedures in place for zealous protection of members of the congregation

against known child molesters. And not that there was reliance on that, the Court specifically excluded that claim because it wasn't alleged, but that by virtue of some negligent conduct it increased the danger present to Ms. Lewis at that time. And I think it's important to remember that in the context of what discovery is relevant and what privileges ought to be upheld by the Court.

So going back to this issue of religious privilege, Rule 505, the language -- I hesitate to do this Judge, having heard that you spent a lot of time with these issues, but I'll remind the Court any way, the privilege --

THE COURT: I don't think you have to remind me about the language. I'm well aware of it.

MR. LYNN: All right. So, Judge, the issue here is what was the purpose of this communication between the Elders at the Bellows Falls congregation and the Elders at Watchtower.

And, Your Honor, I think it's important to remember that the Elders at the Bellows Falls Congregation are what I would characterize as very part-time. These are not priests or ministers whose full-time job is to engage in spiritual guidance and to be ministers or priests for the congregation. These are members of the community who have jobs like everybody else and who find and devote the time necessary to be Elders in their congregation.

And so, of course, one of the procedures that exist when there are these kinds of very serious allegations of sinful behavior is to seek guidance from the more full-time Elders at Watchtower around how ecclesiastically to handle those kinds of allegations.

And we don't dispute that it sometimes triggers investigations and sometimes that it triggers judicial committees, but these judicial committees are all internal ecclesiastical organizations and they are purely spiritual in nature. They have no authority civilly or criminally in the State of Vermont, but purely are church functions.

And so what we would suggest to you, Your Honor, is that any documents that are generated in connection with those communications between the Elders on the one hand in Bellows Falls seeking guidance on how spiritually to deal with an issue fall perfectly within the confines of Rule 505.

THE COURT: What about the confidentiality part of that?

MR. LYNN: Well, I think that we have presented information through the affidavits that were appended to our motion for a protective order that indicates that, in fact, there is an expectation that this is confidential, that it will remain within the organization. People are not at liberty to go into the community at large and talk about

these issues.

And that is why I would argue, Your Honor, that it is confidential. What we haven't heard from Mr. Storey, and there is no argument, is that we generally tell people, in fact, what you heard from Mr. Storey is that when these communications are made, the very first thing that is done is that the legal department, and we've asserted an attorney-client privilege for those communications, deals with the question of whether the people bringing the report are mandatory reporters under that state's laws and whether there's a privilege that would prevent them from discussing that information.

And so, Your Honor, absent that kind of statutory mandatory reporter requirement then the information is kept within the organization.

Now, the victims, we agree that there's nothing that would prevent others who are not involved in those confidential communications to report that to the authorities. But, again, what we're looking at now specifically are those communications made by the Elders in Bellows Falls to the Elders at Watchtower.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I don't understand, as I think was, Mr. Storey said, is that there are communications certainly about the sexual abuse perhaps by alleged victims or their family to Bellows Falls. So how are those

considered confidential communications to an ecclesiastical person? Well, again, the communication, I'm MR. LYNN: sorry, Your Honor, I didn't mean to interrupt you. The communication within the church, of course, is also confidential. But the communicant, the one providing the information, is the one who has the right to waive that privilege. Any person is entitled, if they want, to tell the authorities, or whomever they like, about the alleged abuse or sinful conduct, whatever that is. But what we're seeing in this instance is the further communication by the Elders internally within the organization seeking guidance

THE COURT: Well, it's more than spiritually isn't it? I mean, they go to the legal department. They are asking for legal advice.

and advice on how spiritually to handle allegations, whether

it's abuse or some other serious sin.

MR. LYNN: Well, Your Honor, they go to the legal department, as Mr. Storey said, for one specific purpose. And that is to determine whether there is a requirement that it be reported under the various laws of the various states. There has to be an interpretation as to who is a mandatory reporter. But this is — those documents are different documents. Those are documents where Your Honor we believe that there is an attorney-client privilege.

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The first step in this analysis for some of these documents is, is there a religious privilege. And the argument is, Your Honor, that those communications are being made solely for the purpose of seeking spiritual religious organizational advice on how to handle allegations of sin. So, Your Honor, those are the arguments we would raise with respect to the documents where we have raised the religious privilege under Rule 505. Now the attorney-client privilege, Your Honor, those, we believe that what we've heard from Mr. Storey and what you see in the pleadings is very clear, that when there are allegations of unlawful conduct that those are, those are brought to the lawyers. Determinations are made about what is disclosable or what is protected by privilege, who is a mandatory reporter, and that is classically information that comes within the context of attorney-client privilege. THE COURT: You submitted those to me. We did, Your Honor. MR. LYNN: THE COURT: And I've looked at those. And I'm prepared to make rulings on them. Thank you, Your Honor. We expected so. MR. LYNN: And then, and then there is the other two privileges that we raised, and I quess calling a third party privacy privilege might be stretching it, but there is some,

Your Honor, deep concern that this information be

disseminated in a public way, that these are allegations, there is no criminal public proceeding that we know of that goes to these issues.

In fact, I think as the Court is probably aware from the many pleadings submitted in this case, that there is not even a DCF registry entry for Mr. True. That he was removed from the registry after twice passing polygraph examinations.

And so we're concerned not only for him, but for others whose names are contained in these documents that they become public. And I'm pleased to hear there's now a willingness to agree to confidentiality. Up until this moment there has not been.

THE COURT: All right. And you are agreeable to that as well?

MR. LYNN: On those issues we are, Your Honor. Definitely.

The last issue is the First Amendment privilege.

And, Judge, we cited a number of cases. But those cases that we've cited almost universally stand for the proposition that in this country there are, there is a status accorded to religious organizations where the state ought to tread carefully in trying to either force those organizations to do things that are not consistent with their religious beliefs or to force those organizations to

discourage information which is deeply sensitive and central to their religious tenets.

And so, Your Honor, we think that to the extent that this Court does not believe such a privilege exists, we believe that it does, but to the extent that this Court does not believe it exists that in any event those cases ought to inform its conduct or its decisions in this case around what information is ordered produced and which information is not.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LYNN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. STOREY: Your Honor, just very briefly in response. First, in following up on those particular requests that I had mentioned, the request for the Body of Elders letters was request 63. And the request for the branch organization was request 66.

THE COURT: And those are different from the other issue that we're going to be dealing with?

MR. STOREY: They are. They are.

Now, there was something that Mr. Lynn said. And he said there's an expectation that statements of this type would stay in the congregation. And I point to the language of the statute and say that's not enough. The language specifically says that there can be no disclosure to someone

not present except in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.

And we've discussed this investigation process, we've discussed the way that, you know, a person who moves on to a new congregation would have a letter of introduction written, discussions with the legal department. These are all for different purposes than the original communication would have been, which would have been either a communication seeking that some action be taken against a molester or that there be some vigilance or potentially that the molester himself had confessed.

But, you know, we've got a circumstance where the various multiple disclosures within the organization, and sometimes outside of the organization to authorities, are not made for the same purpose as the original communication.

And for that reason the argument that all of this is intended to stay in the congregation fails as a matter of law.

Now, there was something that was hammered pretty hard in the briefs from Watchtower and was alluded to, which is that these communications are from Elder to Elder seeking spiritual advice.

So, effectively what this argument wants to do is ignore where this information came from. For instance, if congregant A. comes to the Elder and says, hey, we think

that congregant B. is molesting a child, and the Elder calls the Service Department to discuss it. What you've heard is that because the Elder is seeking legal or seeking spiritual advice from Watchtower everything going back to the first communication is privileged.

Effectively what the defendant wants to do is give any Elder the ability to take unprivileged material and make it privileged simply by communicating it to the Watchtower.

And that's antithetical to the confidentiality that's required by the statute for application of the privilege.

And, finally, with respect to the First Amendment issue, I quote to a case General Counsel and Finance and Administration with the United Methodist Church versus Superior Court. This is a case where Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion serving as circuit judge. And he talked about this doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention.

And what he said was that these notions are quote, not applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant albeit a religiously affiliated organization. And that's because, the reason for those First Amendment principles is to, quote, avoid a, quote, perceived danger that in resolving intra-church disputes the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.

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We have none of that here. We have a discovery dispute asking that documents be produced. The Court in no way is being asked to weigh in on the validity or appropriateness of those religious beliefs. As such, the First Amendment doesn't apply. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Your Honor, if I could just briefly MR. LYNN: speak to 63 and 66 because I don't think that there was discussion about that up until this point why they ought to be produced. Okay. Let me get them first then. Yeah, please, Your Honor. MR. LYNN: THE COURT: Okay. Is it, produce all Body of Elders's letters distributed by you between January 1, 1975 and September 30, 2014? Is that the one you're talking about? Yeah, that's the first one, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. I'll remind the Court that the MR. LYNN: allegations in this case have nothing to do with the year 2014 or 2015 or, frankly, the 2000's at all. allegations that arose from a time in the 1990's. you'll see in response to request for production number 63 we offer, subject to confidentiality, to produce documents that at least have some relevance to this case, but we do

1 object as irrelevant documents that extend beyond 2 December 31, 1996. And so, Judge, by virtue of that December 31, 1996 3 date, I think what we are contemplating is that we'll 4 5 produce everything up and to and beyond the time of report 6 to us of this abuse even though it was years before in '94 7 and '95. But documents after that date have no bearing, 8 Your Honor, on the allegations of liability or damages in 9 this case. 10 And, likewise, you'll see in response to 66 --11 THE COURT: That's about all Branch 12 Organization -- all iterations of Branch Organization 13 between 1990 and the present? 14 MR. LYNN: Yeah. And, Your Honor, again, you'll see that the objections that we raised to that are that it's 15 16 not, it's not relevant to the allegations in this case, that 17 it is far broader than what ought to be considered by the 18 Court. And let me remind the Court again, that what we're 19 20 dealing with in this case is that there is, there was a policy of zealous supervision, zealous care for those who 21 22 are known to be child molesters and that our conduct either 23 pursuant or inconsistent with that policy led to the abuse by virtue of increasing the level of danger. 24 25 Those documents have nothing to do with that

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theory of liability. The argument we've heard from counsel
was that there are some documents they are seeking which
will show that Mr. True was our agent. Your Honor, what is
undisputed before the Court now is that Mr. True was not a
ministerial servant. He was not an Elder within the
organization. He was only, at the time of this alleged
abuse, a member of the congregation. So any claim that he
was our agent is tenuous at best, but these requests in 66
go far beyond trying to establish that a ministerial servant
or a member of the congregation is an agent of Watchtower.
                     And what about 69? Sixty-nine for you
          THE COURT:
actually is about insurance policies, which I don't think is
at issue or is it?
         MR. LYNN: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
          MR. STOREY: No, Your Honor, it's not.
         THE COURT:
                     So I guess it was 69 if it applies to
the Bellows Falls Congregation. That was, right?
         MR. STOREY: Yes, Your Honor.
                     We don't have an issue with 69?
          THE COURT:
          MR. STOREY: We didn't raise that in our motion
with respect to Bellows Falls, however.
          THE COURT:
                      I beg your pardon?
         MR. STOREY: We didn't raise that in our motion
with respect to Bellows Falls. So 69 shouldn't be at issue.
          THE COURT:
                     All right.
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1 MR. STOREY: One brief thing. 2 THE COURT: Well, just so I'm clear, so we're only dealing -- outside of the privilege log we're only dealing 3 4 with then 63 and 66? 5 MR. STOREY: Yes. Because 65 and 67 will be with 6 the other motion. 7 Right. Okay. Sorry. Go ahead. THE COURT: 8 MR. STOREY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Just one 9 brief thing. Something that Mr. Lynn had said on rebuttal 10 was that it's undisputed that Norton True was not a 11 ministerial servant at the relevant time period. And that's 12 not the case. 13 It's certainly not undisputed. We don't have any 14 information, and they've refused to give us information, as 15 to when he was and wasn't a ministerial servant. So it's 16 not an undisputed issue, Your Honor. Well, Your Honor, we know that the 17 18 plaintiff's mother was a member of the church at that time. 19 We know that this is an issue we put front and center in the 20 pleadings to the Court. And we know that there is no factual information from the Court, nor could there ever be, 21 22 that disputes the fact that he was not a ministerial servant 23 at the time of this alleged abuse. 24 So just simply saying it is undisputed can't make 25 And, by the way, if they really had some serious it true.

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concern about whether these statements were true or not, I suspect we would have seen a discovery request somewhere along the line that sought to ferret out that issue and that is not the case. So, Judge, it is undisputed on the record in this Court in this case that he was not a ministerial servant at the time. What I would also say, Your Honor, as I look at 66, and I want to be clear about this, the request is, please produce all iterations of branch organization in effect between 1990 and present. So, Your Honor, again, there is no relevance to that request and the theories of liability in this case. Branch organization doesn't let us know to any certainty whether Mr. True was an employee of Watchtower. Branch Organization Members doesn't tell us whether there was some policy of Bellows Falls that was not properly followed or was overzealously followed. This is, Your Honor, a fishing expedition which is only illustrated by the fact that they are looking for those iterations all the way up to present. Okay. I think we've covered that THE COURT: Let me get myself oriented here again and we'll go on to the next one. So, I think the next one is similar, but it

involves the Bellows Falls Congregation. And that is

1 document 68 of 10-13-15, which is the plaintiff's motion to 2 compel Bellows Falls Congregation to compel. 3 And, again, it seems to me perhaps there are a 4 couple of others as has appeared now with Watchtower that 5 weren't covered by the privilege log, but what I did is I 6 went through the privilege log and compared it to the 7 motion. And it appears that those documents are the ones at 8 Maybe some others, but I'll hear if there is. issue. 9 So, why don't you go ahead again. 10 MR. STOREY: Your Honor, in the interest of 11 brevity, I think the issues with respect to privilege and 12 the First Amendment so heavily overlap what we've just 13 If we could just have Bellows Falls argue and I'll 14 respond to anything they raise. There's nothing really 15 further that I can add. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Do you think there are other 17 documents though than the ones on the privilege log here? 18 MR. STOREY: Again, it's the same as with respect 19 to Watchtower. We have asked for Watchtower to produce all 20 Body of Elders letters it sent. We had asked Bellows Falls 21 to produce Body of Elders letters it received. So they are 22 going to be the same issues that were just discussed. 23 There's nothing new or nothing different.

THE COURT: Do you know which request that is?

MR. STOREY: I can give that to you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Okay. So who is going to argue for Bellows Falls?

MS. McDONALD: Your Honor, and I agree with Attorney Storey, that the issues are extremely similar, although I would like to stress on behalf of the local congregation that our congregants, our Elders understood that when they were seeking spiritual advice from either the Elders in the local Congregation or seeking spiritual advice from the Service Department, that these communications will be confidential.

It's an extremely important part of the religion.

It is understood by members of the religion. And Attorney

Storey had mentioned earlier that the policies of the

Jehovah's Witnesses religion don't lend themselves to our

evidentiary protection of religious communications. And we

certainly disagree with that point.

I would also like to draw the Court's attention to the fact that numerous documents in Bellows Falls' privilege log relate to individuals who are not parties to this action. They relate to, for example, plaintiff's father and spiritual advice that he received from our congregation, not in connection with the allegations in this case. They relate to other third parties.

These communications have nothing to do with this lawsuit. We shouldn't be required to produce that. That

also goes to the third party privacy that our congregation obviously is particularly concerned about.

Merely agreeing to a confidentiality order, while we would certainly do that, there are going to be names of individuals in here that have nothing to do with this case. And the confidentiality order, even if it's for attorney's eyes only, is certainly not going to be enough to cover that.

THE COURT: Why not?

MS. McDONALD: Because those individuals, even if they are going to be seen, their names are going to be seen by the attorneys in that case, they shouldn't be -- they shouldn't -- they are required to see or allowed to see that information about people who have nothing to do with this litigation, don't even know about the allegations of abuse, don't even know anything about this case, but are merely mentioned in the documents as third parties in reference to other things. I don't think a confidentiality order covers that particular third party privacy issue.

THE COURT: Well, I assume what they are looking for perhaps is other allegations against Mr. True?

MS. McDONALD: And we -- and that may be, but I'm also specifically speaking of third parties who have nothing to do with that. That there may be reference to names and other instances of seeking spiritual advice that are beyond

1 the scope of even abuse allegations. 2 I think --THE COURT: Well, again, I think that's the 3 4 purpose of a confidentiality order that it remains with the 5 lawyers and unless there's a request that it be made public 6 at a later time, for instance, at trial, or whenever, that's 7 where it stays. 8 MS. McDONALD: Certainly, Your Honor. I think the 9 other point, and this is what Attorney Lynn just mentioned, 10 is that many of the documents, particularly in the Bellows 11 Falls privilege log, are dated long after the period of the 12 abuse. And given the status of the claims in this case the 13 dates that the abuse is alleged to have occurred, which is 14 between 1991 and 1994, we would certainly submit that any 15 documents around that date, and certainly documents in the 16 late '90's and well into the 2000's, should not be produced 17 in this case and don't have anything to do with our clients. 18 Okay. Do you want to respond to that? THE COURT: 19 MR. STOREY: Yes, Your Honor. First, the request 20 to Bellows Falls for the Body of Elders letters was request 21 number 64. I'm sorry? 22 THE COURT: 23 Sixty-four, Your Honor. And just two MR. STOREY: 24 quick points. One, Bellows Falls points out that some of 25 these documents relate to plaintiff's father and they

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question whether there's any relevance to those documents. The response would be that ultimately we're going to see arguments from the defendant trying to explain that any damages the plaintiffs suffered were not from molestation by True, but were from other things. And without having seen this document, I don't know what's in it, but I think it's exceedingly likely that the subject of that document may be pointed to by the defendants as being a traumatic event or something of that sort that would have caused damages. So we need to be able to see it to assess it and take it into account in our damages case in responding to arguments that we may seek from them. And the second point would be that documents generated after 2000 or, pardon me, 1996 are irrelevant. THE COURT: Are what? MR. STOREY: Irrelevant. That seemed to be the thrust of the argument about documents generated in 2006 or 2007. What we know from their arguments in the briefing is that there was a complaint obviously by each of my clients, Annessa and her sister. There was a complaint by another person who was a step-granddaughter of Norton True. And in the discovery they've indicated that there was a complaint that came along by someone else. And there

are letters in the privilege log from 2006, from 2012.

don't know which of those deal with the complaint by the other individual, but there had been a report of molestation that came along regarding True at a later date.

And whether it provides notice or not or whether the events occurred before my clients were abused, whether the abuse occurred is going to be a disputed issue here.

And having another person who can testify about that is going to be important.

You know, so documents generated, just because they are generated after the abuse in this case doesn't mean they don't contain relevant information or things that can relate to events that occurred earlier in time.

So I would ask that those documents be produced even if they were dated after 1996.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. McDONALD: Your Honor, if I could just briefly address that last point? I think that Attorney Storey's argument highlights our concerns with third party privacy interests. Individuals, and we've mentioned this and this will come up in connection with the next motion, but names of individuals that are within documents that were generated in connection to seeking spiritual advice within our congregation, those names of those individuals, they have a right to privacy. They have a right not to be contacted by attorneys in connection with a lawsuit that is not related

to them, that they haven't brought.

They expected that when they sought spiritual advice from the Elders within their congregation that that advice would be confidential. I understand that's an argument, but they certainly did not expect to be contacted by plaintiff's counsel for a plaintiff they may not even themselves know. Particularly when, as Attorney Storey has mentioned, that maybe there are documents that were generated post-1996, those have nothing to do with notice pre-1991 when Miss Lewis' abuse is alleged to have occurred.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else?

MR. STOREY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, I think the last group before I, well, there may be one after this too. Yes, there is. There's actually the motion by the defendants to have the plaintiff produce to them discovery. But before we get to that, I think there are three related motions about other discovery. I think there are two discovery issues in regard to both Watchtower, Bellows Falls and Mr. Carleton's client, the third party, non-party, I shouldn't say that. Anyway, the Christian Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses.

So they are related. Maybe I'll give you

Mr. Carleton an opportunity to speak. And as I say, they

seem to involve the other two parties as well. So certainly

I'll give everybody else a chance to speak if they wish to.

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MR. CARLETON: Your Honor, in terms of sequency I
think it probably makes sense to hear from the Watchtower
and from Bellows Falls on the protective order issues first
only because the, CCJW is easier to say than Christian
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses. CCJW really is kind of
like the stepchild argument in this entire protective order
issue. It came into being only in 2001.
          And so all the arguments that are pertinent up to
2001 apply with greater force from 2001 going forward.
          So, you know, I'm happy to speak on behalf of CCJW
now, but I'm also -- my thought was that it makes more sense
to hear about the first protective order concerns first.
          THE COURT:
                      Okay. If you don't want to speak
first then I'll let somebody else do it.
          MR. LYNN:
                    May I, Your Honor?
          THE COURT:
                      You may.
          MR. LYNN:
                     Thank you.
                      So let me just set the record straight
          THE COURT:
for my purposes as well.
                     Please do.
          MR. LYNN:
                     We're dealing with, in this case,
          THE COURT:
document 70, which is your, it's defendant Watchtower's
motion for a protective order. And that regards document
requests 65 and 67, which are the same as request to Bellows
Falls and I think to the Christian Congregation as documents
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     65 and 67. Maybe I mis-spoke there.
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               Okay. I think we're talking about 65 and 67 as
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     far as you're concerned, Mr. Lynn, correct?
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Yes.
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               THE COURT: And, however, with Bellows Falls
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     Jehovah's Witnesses it's 66 and 67.
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                          They are all nodding their head, Judge.
               MR. LYNN:
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               THE COURT: Right. And then back 65 and 67 to Mr.
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     Carleton's client, right?
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               MR. CARLETON: That's correct, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                          All right. And let me just refresh my
     recollection, but 65 is the documents in response to a
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     March 14, 1997 letter, correct?
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               MR. LYNN: Correct.
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               THE COURT: And then 67 is any documents
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     referencing any allegations of sexual abuse of children
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     within Jehovah's Witnesses Church since, within the church
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     itself since 1960. And I think it was your response, Mr.
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     Lynn, or response made to the motion that there are no
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     documents involving the plaintiff, her parents, R.B., B.S.
21
     or True exist.
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Correct.
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               THE COURT:
                           Correct?
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Correct.
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               THE COURT:
                           And then your response to 67 was, any
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documents that pertain to the plaintiff, her parents, sister Miranda or R.B. and B.S. and True have been produced or are on the privilege log, correct? MR. LYNN: Correct. Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So, go ahead. The, as you can see, Your Honor, the issue, and let's start with 65 first since it is sequentially the first one that the Court encounters. was a letter that was generated on March 14th, 1997. letter is in the record. I'm sure the Court has had an opportunity to see it. And essentially it was a request for information from the 14,400 congregations across this country to provide us with specific information around known child abusers. And there were responses that were sent. tell the Court that the responses are kept electronically. And I think the Court saw the affidavit from Mr. Chapel which discusses how we try to access that information. lot of it is very difficult to access because the terms child abuse are not used. But, in any event, there has been at least one court which, with redactions, has suggested we need to produce those materials. And as I understand it that is underway. But, Your Honor, you saw there are two courts which were very clear that these were documents that went

beyond the scope of discovery, what ought to be proper discovery and declined to order production and granted a protective order, did not force us to provide that information.

We think that those courts, New Mexico and Ohio, got it right. And what I would suggest to the Judge, Your Honor, is that this is particularly true in light of the 2015 revisions to Rule 26 and the scope of appropriate discovery.

As the Court knows, that having raised that very issue that, in fact, the scope of discovery seems to have narrowed significantly, particularly where a large volume of documents is being sought, where significant efforts have to be made.

Remember, Your Honor, we as counsel, will have to review all of those materials, make determinations independent of anyone else as to what is appropriately producible and what is not. And that is hours upon hours and hours of time.

Your Honor, even if we got by the issues of relevance under Rule 26, it is beyond the scope of appropriate discovery. It is not proportional to what is really at issue in this case. And what is really at issue in this case is what happened in Bellows Falls around Mr. True and around the Lewises.

And we have demonstrated our willingness to either produce those materials or provide a very significant description of them. In fact, produce them in-camera to the Court. There is no objection to those materials, if ordered by the Court, to produce them on the issue of relevance.

But, Your Honor, we have a very significant argument around the relevance of responses from New Mexico or responses from West Virginia about whether somebody has allegations of child abuse against them, particularly in light of the allegations or the liability claims that survive in this case.

And, of course, what I would ask the Court to do is to make a determination as to what is relevant information based on the liability claims that survive the motion to dismiss.

And I'm not going to articulate what those were again. But, Your Honor, there are very narrow claims that exist in this case after the motion to dismiss. And it will be a difficult task, near impossible task, for any convincing argument to be made that somehow these materials from Alaska, letters that came in in 1999 from Alaska in response to this 1997 letter somehow are relevant to these claims.

Now, the arguments raised by the plaintiff to support the production were as follows: They have to review

each one, they have to review all of these because it establishes the standard of care, that somehow what may have happened after the events in this case or 20 years before or in Alaska somehow will inform whether the people in Bellows Falls followed a policy which they allege was excellent, which was vigorous, zealous, watchfulness and care were there allegations of sexual abuse. And, Your Honor, we would argue to you that there is no conceivable relevance.

The second argument is that it will go to the reasonableness of the policies and procedures. But, Judge, their argument is we had great policies and procedures.

That's not the issue in this case. The issue in this case is did we follow those policies and procedures.

The next argument is, was it the reasonableness of whether to accept the denials of Norton True. And, Your Honor, that argument makes no sense. Whether Norton True was convincing to the people in Bellows Falls, and parenthetically when he passed the two polygraph tests and convinced the state of Vermont to remove him from the sex offender registry, whether that was convincing or not has nothing to do with a letter we received from Alaska.

The next argument they raise is that it was -whether they need the documents to know whether it was
reasonable to accept the recantation of another complainant
who subsequently recanted. Your Honor, you saw the

materials, there was a woman named R.B. who raised initially allegations then withdrew the allegations against Mr. True and somehow, again, the argument is, by virtue of some three line or 10 line letter that doesn't give us the specifics from Indiana we're going to know whether the people in Bellows Falls acted appropriately in accepting the recantation from R.B.. But, Your Honor, again, the issue is here, whether we followed a policy that they say was vigorous and zealous.

And so, again, Your Honor, no relevance, no convincing argument as to why it would ever be relevant to the claims that are alive in this case.

And then the final argument is that somehow it is these materials with unlimited dates in which they were, the alleged acts occurred, unlimited in terms of the dates in which the correspondence was sent, but somehow they are relevant to the issue of punitive damages.

And as the Court well knows punitive damages focuses on the specific conduct directed to this plaintiff at the time of, up to the time of the alleged harm.

What happened, again, in California, or what happened in New Mexico, or what happened in Texas, Your Honor, has no bearing whatsoever to punitive damages in this case. It is our view, Your Honor, that these materials that are being sought are wholly irrelevant.

And then the next step is even if the Court were to order their production, Your Honor, consider for a moment the exercise we would have to go through in determining whether they ought to be produced or not. We would have to then begin an analysis of privilege on a state by state basis because each state has subtly, sometimes not so subtly different laws around what is privileged and what is not privileged.

We would have to consider third party interests.

Remember, Your Honor, these documents will have the names of people who are accused of sexual abuse.

There's no indication that they have been -- in the documents there may or may not be any indication as to whether they've been convicted, whether the evidence is convincing or persuasive.

Your Honor, it is our perspective that these are a large volume of documents that have absolutely nothing to do with the issues central to this case.

And we think the courts in New Mexico and Ohio that have rejected this request are the ones who got it right. And the ones in California where, frankly, judges are elected, we think got it wrong.

THE COURT: So, again, just to make sure that I understand, you have already, that is, your client has already turned over everything, no, I'm sorry, you're saying

1 that you reviewed all your files and there are nothing 2 involving this case? 3 MR. LYNN: Correct. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. LYNN: Everything that relates to this case is 6 either in the privilege log, which we submitted to the 7 Court, or has already been produced. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. LYNN: And then, so as the Court is aware from 10 the decisions from various judges around the country, 65 is 11 not a new discovery request. Sixty-seven is. And our 12 perspective is that this is sort of incrementally trying to 13 expand the reach of discovery for the cases that plaintiff's 14 law firm is pursuing throughout the country. And so they 15 will, in cases in various forms, see if they can get more 16 favorable rulings and expand the database that they have 17 available to them in identifying potential claims. 18 And, Your Honor, that may or may not be true, but 19 certainly is the perspective of a client who fails to 20 understand how, I'm looking at 67 now, documents referencing 21 allegations of sexual abuse of children since 1960. 22 almost 60 years, right, 60 years of documents they want us 23 to produce without any showing whatsoever that it is 24 relevant to any of the issues that matter in this case. 25 Judge, we believe --

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you I'm not going to do it to the 1960's.

MR. LYNN: Thank you. Thank you very much. And so, Your Honor, those are the arguments that we think are availing and persuasive.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Storey?

MR. STOREY: Good morning, Your Honor. Two quick points before jumping into the relevance issue. First, you know, there was the not so subtle insinuation that this request is solely to solicit new clients. And I'd note that we've repeatedly said, redact the names of the victims, we don't need it. We're clearly not seeking to solicit new clients. We've requested this information because we believe it's very relevant to the claims.

And, second, there were at various times representations that we believe Watchtower's policies are great or excellent. And I think the Court would be hard pressed to find anywhere in the complaint where we said the policies are great. We did allege that they failed to comply with the policy, but our position is not and never has been that these policies were great or the state of the art.

Now, with respect to these particular documents, there was some discussion about whether Watchtower has identified everything with respect to Norton True and the

1 plaintiff. And that --2 THE COURT: Or has put it on their privilege log? MR. STOREY: Or has put it on their privilege log, 3 4 And it's neither here nor there with respect to 5 this particular request. This particular request number 65 6 and 67 aren't specifically seeking information regarding 7 It's seeking to determine what did this Norton True. 8 organization know about molestation within its ranks 9 generally. 10 So it's molestation explicitly by others other 11 than True that we're seeking to get information about. 12 In other places? THE COURT: 13 MR. STOREY: In other places at other times, yes. 14 THE COURT: Why? 15 MR. STOREY: Well, a number of reasons. And first 16 and foremost, the defense we have seen repeatedly from 17 Watchtower and they've put on an expert in other cases, Dr. 18 Monica Applewhite, and she's testified, look court, you have 19 to, in determining the standard of care and determining 20 whether the defendant acted reasonably, you need to look at 21 what was known by society generally at the time of the 22 abuse. So, they don't want to look at today's standards. 23 24 They want to look at what was known in, in this case, it 25 would be 1991 through '94, sometime in that timeframe.

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     that will be the testimony they put on.
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               They'll have an expert witness talking about what
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     the state of the art was and the state of the societal
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     knowledge was about child abuse. So --
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               THE COURT:
                          Well, as it applies to Vermont, for
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     instance, or Bellows Falls?
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               MR. STOREY: Well, they haven't limited that. You
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     know, they've tried to put on testimony or at least their
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     expert has testified in these cases that, you know, this is
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     the state of societal awareness in the United States during
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     these periods of time, so given that, Watchtower acted
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     reasonably.
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               So, we've requested this information to combat
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     that. To say, well, that's fine, it's well and good what
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     society knew about molestation at that time, but what did
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     Watchtower know? You know, did it act reasonably in light
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     of the information available to it?
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                           So that expert was able to testify I
               THE COURT:
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     quess about that?
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               MR. STOREY: We didn't go to trial on either case,
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     Your Honor. She gave the testimony and was designated.
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     deposed her.
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                           So you don't know whether it would
               THE COURT:
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    have been admitted by the judge?
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                            We don't know if it would have been
               MR. STOREY:
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     admitted, correct. And I can tell you candidly that we
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     would have mounted a vigorous motion in limine trying to
     keep it out, but regardless, there's the possibility that
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     they offered that testimony.
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               THE COURT:
                           Should that, should your argument be
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     made at that point?
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               MR. STOREY: Well, what you're hearing from them
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     is it's so difficult to produce. If we wait until that time
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     and we're on the --
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                          Well, it seems to me, it is a lot of
               THE COURT:
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     stuff they'd have to try and find to look through.
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               MR. STOREY: Some of it yes, some of it no.
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               MR. LYNN: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt, but we
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     did, in the pleadings, indicate to you that we will not be
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     calling Dr. Applewhite in this case. So that issue is
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     closed.
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               MR. STOREY: Your Honor, at the same time, they
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     said we're not going to call that witness, but in the very
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     next sentence they say, but you have to understand that what
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     we know now is not the same. I mean, it's explicitly in the
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     reply brief.
22
                          Well, I shouldn't interrupt Your Honor.
               MR. LYNN:
23
               THE COURT: No, why don't you wait.
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Sure.
25
               MR. STOREY:
                            I can get it for you in a moment.
                                                                So
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that's issue one on the relevance in terms of responding to this argument that we expect that they will make and have made repeatedly.

Secondarily, we have argued or the defendant has raised this issue of these actions that happened in this case specifically. For example, True. But he is accused multiple times of molesting children by R.B., by my clients. And there was a later accusation. Each time he denied it. And each time those accusations were accepted.

And to some extent Watchtower's experience in dealing with circumstances like this, where a person keeps skating on these allegations, is going to be relevant to deciding what they should have done in this circumstance.

You know, if they understand that their policies aren't sufficient to allow the Elders at the local level to get to the bottom of this stuff, and they are letting these molesters skate, and there are subsequent allegations, then we need to be able to look at whether Watchtower was reasonable in having the policies they had and taking the actions they had.

Additionally, we have a claim for punitive damages in this case. And this information is relevant to two specific aspects of punitive damages. First, to whether the defendant acted with malice and whether, or recklessness, and whether punitive damages are applicable or should be

imposed at all.

And the test there is whether there's conduct manifesting personal ill-will or carried out under circumstances evidencing insult or oppression or even by conduct showing a reckless or wanton disregard of one's rights.

So, in looking at that particular standard, if, for instance, these documents show that there were thousands of complaints of child molestation in the Jehovah's Witnesses, and they knew that it was a very substantial problem, but they didn't take action sufficient to curb it, that would be very relevant to our showing of reckless or wanton disregard of someone's rights.

Now, secondarily, there's an issue with respect to the valuation of punitive damages. And what the Court is saying, and this is Shahi versus Madden, the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damage award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. And in Carptentier the Court said, in assessing the reprehensibility of a defendant's actions a jury may consider whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated event.

So, again, the extent to which molestation was prevalent within the organization would be relevant to determining the reprehensibility of Watchtower's action.

So for a number of reasons, the information we've requested is relevant, is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence and this information should be produced.

Now, the defendants have also made an argument about the burden of producing it, that we're looking for a lot. And there's two responses to that. There's two separate requests here.

Now, in looking at request 65, which is the March 14th, 1997 responses, those documents are being gathered pursuant to a court order. They are incrementally being produced to my firm. They are subject to a protective order so I can't discuss what's in them, but we are getting them, Watchtower's producing them and will produce them.

So, there's no additional burden in requiring them to be produced in this case. There's no extra work that's going to go into it. It's the same documents. They are going to get turned over.

So, with respect to request 67, which is the broader request for all complaints dating back to 1960, and, you know, I'll start first with the reason for that request. You know, the document retention policy that was in effect at Watchtower up until 1997 didn't require this type of material to be kept forever. This type of information was kept for a period of time and could be discarded thereafter.

And the Branch Organization excerpts that we provided to the Court discuss the policy for going through the files every couple of years and getting rid of outdated material.

So, you have a circumstance where if we had simply requested, you know, the complaints dating back to 1960, a lot of things would be missing. So we asked for the second request, which was generated later, and were more complete with respect to certain aspects of the institutional awareness, dealing with Elders Administerial Servants.

So we've asked for both of these things to compliment each other, these requests, and to get the, you know, the most in-depth look at what Watchtower knew at various points in times prior to the molestation of the plaintiffs.

And, you know, I've heard the vigorous objection from the defendants over how could documents generated after the date of the abuse possibly be relevant. And it's going to be a mixed bag. Some of it's going to be. Some of those letters are going to refer to things that occurred earlier in time.

There will be, you know, people who were accused of abuse in 2001 or 2006 who had previously been accused and who that was known to the Watchtower or the local congregation.

So the date the document was generated isn't going

1 to immediately mean that it can't be relevant. 2 THE COURT: Okay? 3 MR. STOREY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 4 MR. LYNN: Just a couple words, Judge? 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 MR. LYNN: First of all, this is, I didn't make 7 I'm looking now at the Court's ruling on the 8 motion to dismiss based on the first amended complaint, page 9 The first amended complaint alleges the congregation and 10 Watchtower had a policy of vigilantly monitoring the 11 reported molester for the safety and protection of children 12 in the congregation. I mean, this is the basis of their only claim that 13 14 could ever possibly survive summary judgment because this 15 ministerial servant issue is gone. Judge, that is the narrow focus of this case. 16 17 to somehow suggest we need a complete picture from 1960 and, 18 yes, it might be a mixed bag, meaning, that almost nothing 19 will have any -- no, nothing will have any bearing on this 20 Judge, that only illustrates the point I was trying 21 to make earlier, which is, this searching for documents 22 generally for purposes that have nothing to do with this 23 There is nothing conceivably admissible about almost 24 everything that they've asked for in 65 and 67. 25 the things that are admissible and that could ever be

1 admissible are the things that we have produced. 2 THE COURT: So, Mr. Carleton, do you want to enter into this discussion? 3 4 MR. CARLETON: Very briefly. 5 THE COURT: Well, you can take as much time as you 6 want. 7 MR. CARLETON: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: It was a long trip down here. 9 MR. CARLETON: So, Your Honor, I represent 10 Christian Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses or CCJW. 11 entered my appearance in this case on behalf of CCJW shortly 12 after CCJW filed its motion for protective order. 13 So the only pleading that I've submitted to Your 14 Honor is the one that was submitted on Friday. I'm going to 15 try to be very brief because as I expected Attorney Lynn did 16 a very good job of driving home the core issues of relevance 17 and timing that we believe also preclude discovery request 18 65 and 67 to CCJW. Just because I'm not sure if the Court has a full 19 20 picture of what CCJW is, let me take a minute to explain 21 what the organization is. 22 In 2000 CCJW was incorporated really for spiritual The Watchtower, the world over, is associated with 23 24 the publications that the Jehovah's Witnesses produce. 25 there was some concern that people were losing sight of the

fact that it was really a religion, and it's a spiritual organization.

So CCJW was incorporated and took over all of the communications back and forth between the congregations.

And that was an effort to sort of, you know, highlight the fact that it was indeed a religion.

The only reason CCJW received a subpoena in this case was to recognize corporate formalities. It was at Attorney Lynn's suggestion in a letter dated September 17, 2001 saying, hey, if we're going to argue over documents all the way up until the present date we need to honor the formalities of the corporations. Just send out that subpoena and we'll go from there.

So I'm positive that this Court has already seen beyond kind of the posturing that was in some of the pleadings. There's been no effort to hide documents. There's been no attempt to delay discovery. And there's been no attempt or there's been no refusal by CCJW to respond in any way to the subpoena.

CCJW did, in fact, respond on November, excuse me, November 20th, with responses, objections, production of documents and a privilege log. Okay. So we can set aside all of that.

Now, really the issue before the Court is the same one that was just argued a moment ago, which is whether 65

and 67 are appropriate requests for CCJW. And the issue there is simply one of timing.

The March 14th, 1997 letter went out exactly four full years before CCJW even began sending and receiving communications. You've heard over and over that the Jehovah's Witnesses are a disciplined organization. And that is indeed true.

In response to the 1997 letter, Judge, there was a flurry of responses from the 14,000 some odd congregations around the country. But that happened for 1997 and 1998.

And that was a retro -- the '97 letter was a call for retrospective disclosures. In other words, what happened in the past, what do you know about people in the past that we should be concerned about.

What CCJW almost exclusively has received from 2001 onward is reports from the congregations of activities and concerns and allegations that were happening currently, not retrospectively.

So the -- plus you have 15 years of them, from 2001 to the present. So the notion that we would be called upon to find what we consider to be an irrelevant needle in the enormous haystack of correspondence, I mean, enormous, and difficult to search, as has already been explained, is just beyond the burdens that this Court should impose upon CCJW for the purposes that have been articulated by the

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    plaintiffs in this particular case.
               THE COURT: So, I'm not sure I have your response
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    here in front of me, but does CCJW --
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               MR. CARLETON: CCJW.
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               THE COURT: CCJW, do they have any documents
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     regarding, again, through the other initials his, I'm sorry,
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    her parents, R.B., B.S., so forth?
               MR. CARLETON: Well, to the extent -- to the
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 9
     extent -- I'm sorry.
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                          That are not on the privilege log of
               THE COURT:
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     Watchtower or Bellows Falls?
               MR. CARLETON: I do not -- I believe the answer to
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13
     that question is no.
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               MR. STOREY: Your Honor, there was a separate, I'm
15
     sorry to step in here, there was a separate privilege log
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     from CCJW.
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. STOREY: It identified, I believe, six or
     seven items.
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               MR. CARLETON: Correct.
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               MR. STOREY: It's not before you now. It will be
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     the subject of a future motion, though this Court's order
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     may head that off.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I guess I missed that.
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               MR. CARLETON: Yeah, so we filed our motion for
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    protective order. The plaintiffs responded to it, but
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     didn't raise a separate issue concerning the six documents
     that are on that particular protective order.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. So that's not at issue?
                              That's not before the Court today,
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               MR. CARLETON:
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     no.
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               THE COURT: All right. I can't deal with it I
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     guess, huh?
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               MR. CARLETON:
                              I'm sorry?
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               THE COURT:
                           I can't deal with it? I don't want to
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    have another one of these things.
               MR. CARLETON: My guess is that Your Honor's
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     rulings today will give guidance to the parties in such a
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     way that we could probably take care of it ourselves.
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                           Okay. All right.
               THE COURT:
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               MR. CARLETON: Understanding that the Court
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     doesn't like to revisit the same issues over and over, but
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     the bottom line is, to the extent that any of these issues
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     of relevance, over breadth, undue burden, First Amendment
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    privileges, religious privileges, all of those things apply
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     to the Watchtower, they apply doubly to CCJW because the
     documents that are at issue there are just even further
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23
     attenuated in time, Your Honor.
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               So we would ask for the Court to grant that
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    portion of the protective order as part of its global ruling
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     today.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. CARLETON:
                              Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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               MR. STOREY: Your Honor, just, oh, I'm sorry.
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               MS. McDONALD: Go ahead.
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               MR. STOREY: Go ahead.
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               MS. McDONALD: I was just going to address whether
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    you would like to take up Bellows Falls' motion for
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    protective order separately or whether we should just keep
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     going back and forth?
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               THE COURT: Well, the issues are the same, are
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     they not, except your response is different, of course?
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               MS. McDONALD: The issues, the issues are the
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     same. Our response is slightly different, although
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     obviously it raises all the same issues that have already
17
    been discussed.
18
               THE COURT: Right.
                                   I think you responded to
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     the -- well, it was a little different, maybe we ought to
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     take it after I hear from Mr. Story on Watchtower.
21
     we'll take yours up.
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               MS. McDONALD: Certainly, Your Honor.
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                          On Watchtower, Your Honor, or on CCJW?
               MR. LYNN:
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               THE COURT: Well, we've heard, we've heard from
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    both of you, correct?
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Right. I thought that Mr. Storey has
already responded to everything from Watchtower. Of course,
he can say more.
          THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't we take
Mr. Storey first and then we'll deal with the issue of
Bellows Falls. How's that?
                              Sounds good, Judge.
          MR. LYNN:
                     Thanks.
                       Thank you, Your Honor. Just very
          MR. STOREY:
briefly. With respect to Watchtower, in the reply brief
page four of five, there had been, you know, a statement
that they were going, not going to offer Dr. Applewood as an
expert in this case.
          Plaintiff, next two sentences at the top of page
five, plaintiff says Watchtower will ultimately defend that
it knows more about child abuse now than it did in 1990.
Today's knowledge is no defense to what should have been
done in 1990, regardless of what was known about child abuse
then.
          So, again, they are talking about -- even when in
one sentence they're saying we're not going to use Dr.
Applewhite, the very next sentence they come back and say
that today's knowledge is no defense to what should have
been done then.
          So, we need to figure out what they knew then to
be able to figure out what they should have done and whether
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1 their actions were reasonable. And that's the point. 2 Now, with respect to, there was quite a bit of 3 comment earlier indicating that the time period was not 4 going to go back to 1960. 5 THE COURT: It seems to me that's awfully long. 6 MR. STOREY: Sure. And what I would recommend 7 perhaps is Norton True was made a Ministerial Servant in 8 1976. And perhaps that's a good start date, taking it up 9 from 1976 through the time of the molestation in this case. 10 It's a substantially truncated period of time with 11 a direct tie to the events in this case. 12 I'm sorry, could you tell me again THE COURT: 13 what he became? 14 MR. STOREY: A Ministerial Servant. So that's an 15 appointed position functioning below the Elders in the 16 congregation. But it seems that that's a reasonable time 17 period time to the case that maybe would, would fit the 18 circumstances a little bit better than the request. 19 you. 20 Okay. Miss McDonald? THE COURT: 21 MS. McDONALD: Attorney Storey's argument is a 22 good seg-way into our motion. So the Bellows Falls joined in Watchtower's motion for protective order. Obviously the 23 issues on relevancy and religious privilege and the third 24 25 party privacy interests of our congregants and the Elders at

1 the congregation are certainly the same as the arguments 2 articulated by Attorney Lynn and Attorney Carleton. What I would like to specifically address to the 3 4 Court first is that with respect to number 66, that was the request for the 1997 letter, those did not submit any 5 6 responses to that letter. So there are no documents in 7 response to number 66. 8 THE COURT: All right. MS. McDONALD: As to number 67, and I believe this 9 10 is Attorney Storey's suggestion that documents from 1976, 11 starting when Norton True was appointed as Ministerial 12 Servant to, I believe, the present concerning all 13 allegations of abuse whatsoever, I think that's his 14 suggestion of narrowing the scope of that request. 15 We obviously, we would object to, we object to 16 producing any documents in response to that and suggest that 17 that suggested revised scope does not resolve the relevancy 18 issues that we have here. THE COURT: How about if it's limited to 19 allegations against Mr. True? 20 21 MS. McDONALD: Could you say that again, Your 22 Honor? 23 THE COURT: How about if it's limited to 24 allegations against Mr. True since 1976? 25 I believe that we produced or MS. McDONALD:

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identified in the privilege log all documents that would be
responsive to any such requests. So, again, I think that
kind of takes us outside the 67 request. And it addresses
the other ones that we've already talked about in response
to the motion to compel.
                     I'm sorry, is it 76 or 67?
          THE COURT:
                         Sixty-seven.
                                       My apologies.
          MS. McDONALD:
Seventy-six I believe was the date suggested for the revised
scope of --
          THE COURT:
                     Right.
          MS. McDONALD: -- the disclosure.
          THE COURT: And, I'm sorry, where do we get 67?
          MS. McDONALD: Sixty-seven is the request for all
documents concerning allegations from 1960 onward that
Attorney Storey has now revised to 1976.
          One issue, and this is particular I think to
Bellows Falls and Watchtower as well, is that they request
these all allegations. There's no limit to known abusers,
there's no limit to individuals who have been convicted,
individuals who have been present before a judicial
committee, which is the biblically based process set in
place by the Jehovah's Witnesses.
          This is all allegations. They may very we will be
unsubstantiated allegations. They may be allegations that
were determined to have been false. This is such a broad
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request. It has nothing to do with the issues that are in play in this case which is, first, what was the nature of the relationship between Mr. True and the congregation and the relationship between Mr. True and the plaintiff. And then what defendants knew about Mr. True. The request is far broader than that and I don't think has any relevancy and certainly raises the privacy interests that we've already discussed.

And I think that, that, the absence of that connection is the reason that even this revised scope is just absolutely beyond anything that would be proportional for producing in discovery in this case, Your Honor.

And, again, I think to discuss, as I anticipate

Attorney Storey is also going to mention, the punitive

damages claim in this case. I'm particularly concerned with

the request for the allegations because, again, that doesn't

say what we knew because these allegations not limited at

all may very well be unsubstantiated.

And then it gets into essentially a trial within a trial about whether these prior allegations concerning individuals that have really no other bearing on this case, whether those were substantiated or not, another rush to put us on notice of any issues within the congregation.

It certainly, it's, you know, not only does it not have to do with anyone in this case, but trying to bring

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into this case allegations that may very well have been completely unsubstantiated I think is, again, beyond the scope of anything that we should ever be required to produce. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. You get to go again. MR. STOREY: Sure. Thank you. Just very briefly in response, Your Honor. There were some arguments there about third party privacy and maybe some of these things, allegations were made, but they weren't substantiated. But, again, all of that can be protected with the protective order that the Court had spoken about earlier. Preventing disclosure of any of this material is going to prevent a harm from coming from the production. So, I would argue that any third party privacy issues really shouldn't move the needle here or cause any change in or prevent production anyway, because they are going to be protected by the confidentiality agreement. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. MS. McDONALD: Your Honor, briefly in response to I think that that misses the point of the commonality order and it also misses the point of my argument, which is these very well may be unsubstantiated allegations, but

absent criminal convictions there's simply no way for a

confidentiality order to protect that information or to --

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THE COURT: Well, again, if it's a confidentiality
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     order between all of you, it doesn't go beyond that.
               MS. McDONALD: The issue I think is also then it
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     gets to determining whether or not these allegations are
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     substantiated, which also goes to -- we get into these
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     little mini trials from this trial as to each document that
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     would be produced. And I think, again, the absence of any
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     relevancy and any issues that may cause weighs heavily in
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     favor of not producing those documents.
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               THE COURT: All right. Well, but as we know,
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     we're not talking about a trial, we're talking about
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     discovery at this point. So --
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               MS. McDONALD: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: -- some of what you're saying may be
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     true if it comes to a trial.
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               MS. McDONALD: Thank you.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Anybody else want to enter into
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     the discussion about these motions? All right.
               So, I think this is an easy one. There's a motion
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     that was filed by both defendants, the congregation and
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     Watchtower, back on October 5 asking the Court to compel
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     certain discovery. There was no response by the plaintiff.
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     The Court didn't do anything. But then all these other
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    motions came in. So I assume this is mute. Would I be
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     right?
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No, Your Honor.
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               MR. JUDGE:
                                            It's not mute.
 2
     Sorry, Your Honor. Walter Judge on behalf of Bellows Falls
 3
     Congregation.
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               THE COURT:
                          Right.
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               MR. JUDGE:
                           I can understand Your Honor's
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    perspective, which is that since it hasn't been responded to
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    perhaps it's just sufficient for the Court to order a
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    blanket discovery order.
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               And if that's what the Court is inclined to do
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     then I don't need to argue the specifics of what we're
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     looking for and what hasn't been produced, but I was
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    prepared to talk to Your Honor about what hasn't been
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    produced that we've requested.
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               THE COURT:
                           Well, what about your recent motion?
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     I'm talking about the recent one you filed. I'm talking
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     about an old one.
               MR. JUDGE: Oh, no. No. Yes, you're absolutely
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18
     correct, Your Honor. You're absolutely correct. That one
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     was mute.
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               THE COURT: All right.
                                       So that was easy.
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               MR. JUDGE: That was easier than I made it.
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    That's for sure.
23
                           Okay. So that's document 65 filed on
               THE COURT:
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     October 5 of '15. And that was a joint motion to compel.
25
     And the Court is ruling that that is mute at this point.
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1 Okay? 2 MR. JUDGE: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. So, yes, you are correct, you do have a motion that was filed relatively recently. 4 5 And it was responded to recently. In fact, I think 6 yesterday. 7 So, you want to go ahead and argue it? 8 MR. JUDGE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Sure. 9 Is it acceptable to the Court if I argue from counsel table? 10 THE COURT: Fine. 11 Okay. So, Your Honor, here's what we MR. JUDGE: 12 still don't have. We don't have any medical records from 13 Ms. Lewis from age four to age 21. It is the defendant's position that those medical records must exist somewhere. 14 We don't have the identification of plaintiff's 15 16 childhood pediatricians or primary care providers during 17 that period. We don't have the dates when she was treated 18 by any of the medical doctors, counselors or therapists. We 19 don't have any identification of all of the various, quote, 20 friends that plaintiff has spoken to about her abuse over 21 the years that she's admitted that she's spoken to. 22 We don't have any therapy or counseling records at all from before this lawsuit was filed in October of 2014. 23 24 We don't have any journals or diaries, even though plaintiff 25 admits that she kept at least one. And we don't have any

texts, e-mails, social media, etcetera, etcetera.

Now, we're talking about someone who is currently 28 years old. I don't know if Ms. Lewis is different from everyone else on the planet, but everyone else on the planet at that age sends a thousand texts a day, a thousand e-mails a day and checks their Facebook status a thousand times a day. We don't have anything.

So, let me just elaborate a bit. In plaintiff's answer to her, to interrogatory number four she states that she told, quote, various friends about the alleged molestation. We've been asking counsel for weeks to identify some of those people and so far it hasn't happened.

And this is particularly frustrating because just a few days ago she produced a series of what appeared to be heavily redacted Facebook messages about the alleged molestation. And we quickly tried to go through those before today's hearing and they mention, they talk about the alleged molestation and this case that she was going to bring with her brother -- her sister Jenny and her brother Keith, Junior and some other unknown people whose names appear in the texts, but we've never been provided with any of that information about who they are and how they can be contacted. And we've been asking for that for weeks.

As I said, the plaintiff has not produced any information about her childhood doctors. Now, in this kind

of case, Your Honor, that information would obviously be relevant. We're talking about abuse that, according to the plaintiff, occurred some time between '91 and '94 when she was between the ages of four and seven. And now she's 28 years old.

So, obviously any medical records from her childhood would be extremely relevant to whether the abuse happened, did she ever talk to her doctors about it, did her mother ever talk to the doctors about it, did the doctors ever report it, did the doctors ever recommend therapy, did the doctors do anything about it.

Not only do we not have a single medical record between ages four and 18, but we don't even have the name of the plaintiff's pediatrician. Now, I'm 55. I remember the name of my childhood pediatrician. I went to him every year so on and so forth.

We're talking about a 28 year old person. If she can't remember the name of her pediatrician then her mother can. And if her mother can't her father can.

And if none of those people can remember the name of her pediatrician then her sisters can because they probably went to the same childhood pediatrician. Someone can remember the name of the childhood pediatrician. But we are being told that she can't remember who it was. That's not credible.

In the opposition that was filed yesterday that the Court just alluded to, counsel says that quote, most of her childhood providers report having no records. Well, we would like to know who those childhood providers are that are being referenced because we've never been given the names of any of those people.

Also in that opposition counsel says that defendants are free to subpoena those childhood care providers. Well, you can't send a subpoena if you don't know who they are, number one. And, number two, counsel knows very well that we can send a subpoena to anyone we want and they are not going to send us any records without a signed authorization from the plaintiff, which they refuse to provide.

In the heavily redacted Facebook notes, the handful of notes that plaintiff produced just a few days ago, they show that she was planning her lawsuit in January of 2014, if not earlier. But that's the first note in which she mentions that she's about to file a lawsuit or that she's going to file a lawsuit.

So I would respectfully suggest that that's two years ago. And if steps had been taken when the plaintiff acknowledges that she was going to file a lawsuit in this case to preserve records, medical records, therapy records, and so on and so forth, those records might exist now.

We're being told that those records don't exist.

For example, the plaintiff acknowledges in her interrogatory responses that at age 14 she went to see a Dr. Belcher-Timme, a therapist. She was planning her lawsuit in January of 2014. We are now told that Dr. Belcher-Timme's therapy records were destroyed within the last year.

Those are the only records that plaintiff says in which the, in which she sought therapy before she filed this lawsuit. And now those records are apparently destroyed.

We also have the plaintiff's statements that she attended family counseling therapy with her mother, and possibly others, in 1996 when the parents were getting divorced.

And, by the way, I should add that what we're talking about when we're talking about these 1996 records, and all the medical records that apparently don't exist or plaintiff doesn't know the name of her pediatrician, as I said, those records would obviously be relevant in any case in which a plaintiff is claiming childhood sexual abuse and she's now an adult.

But in this case we have 1996 allegations, not allegations, but we have 1996 a father arrested for abusing the children. We have 1996 mother and father going through divorce proceedings. And we have the mother's allegation in 1996, the mother's acknowledgment in '96 that one of her own

therapy patients who was living in her home sexually molested her children.

Now, if that doesn't make childhood medical and therapy records relevant I don't know what does. So, so we have no therapy records that pre-exist this lawsuit. We have a claim that they don't know who the plaintiff's childhood medical care provider was. And we have no records. And we are being told that the records of Dr. Belcher-Timme have been recently destroyed. And we have the family counseling from 1996 at which Annessa, the plaintiff in this case, was present and in which apparently there was discussion about the abuse that Annessa was alleging. And the plaintiffs refused to produce those records because the mother won't raise, won't waive the privilege for the release of those records.

So records we are being told are the only existing pre-lawsuit counseling records that involve Annessa. They should be produced.

The mother took part in the press conference that was delivered in plaintiff's counsel's office in October,
October 1st, September 30th, 2014, promoting this lawsuit and announcing this lawsuit.

The mother is a promoter of this lawsuit. We do not think that it's fair for her to stand on her claim of privilege as to family counseling records which Annessa was

present and the abuse was allegedly discussed.

And if the other plaintiff Miranda was also there at this counseling, at these counseling sessions in 1996 that breaks the privilege even further.

So we don't think, given that these are the only therapy records, only that the plaintiff that we are being told that exist prior to this lawsuit being filed. We don't think that we should have to suffice with redacted records from those family counseling sessions.

We think those family counseling records, which apparently still exist, which is interesting because you've got a therapist who still has his records from 1996. And then you've got a therapist who saw Annessa alone much later in time and those records have already been destroyed.

But in any case, the 1996 records for the family counseling should be produced in full. That's our position.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'NEILL: Your Honor, we're pleased for Mr. Judge that he lead a life that permitted him to be able to remember who his pediatrician is because he got regular pediatrician visits having wished on every child that exists on the planet going as far back as one can go. That's not true of the plaintiff in this case.

She led a chaotic life. The assault that has just been referenced here --

Well, she must have seen a doctor at 1 2 some point? Oh, she did. But it was chaotic, it 3 MR. O'NEILL: was irregular. She has given us the names of practices that 4 5 she believes she went to. We've talked to her mother. 6 tried to chase them down. And we don't just sit on our 7 hands and when we get, for example, so and so is no longer 8 in practice. We asked the question, where are the records. 9 And we go to that source and try to find the records. 10 We've gone, we've chased down every lead that we 11 have. We have a new lead on a doctor who our best guess, 12 based upon something in Google, he's about 90 years old. 13 And we now think we know where his records, if they existed, 14 were kept. We're going to try to get those. 15 We don't have any disagreement about the 16 relevancy. There's no issue about that. We concur 17 entirely. We're glad to try to find the records. 18 identified providers. We have said specifically, we tried 19 this place, they called us up and said no records. We tried 20 this place, they called us up and said no records. 21 Now, Dr. Timme, who has been referenced, I 22 haven't -- this is the first I've heard about her destroying 23 records within the last year. I was accused of --24 THE COURT: I think he was talking about 25 Belcher-Timme.

MR. O'NEILL: Belcher-Timme, exactly. Well, we were accused of having delayed. We requested the records before suit was filed. We can't produce records that don't exist. If they exist, my attitude with respect to records is very simple, either you produce them, you make every effort to get them, we have and we will continue to do so. If we can't get them we'll just so state.

If there's an instance where they want to depose a particular entity and that entity says with an order to be deposed you need a release from the client, we'll give it to them. We're not going to hand out blanket releases. I've seen them abused in the past. But in terms of getting records we'll get any that we can.

Let's spend a moment talking about this therapy session. The fact is that defendant Bellows Falls says we should get those records, we're entitled to those records, completely ignores privilege. There's a privilege with respect to them. It's a counseling privilege of the litigation on this issue and if they want to go ahead and file a motion to compel and cite the authorities I will be glad to respond to it. We have asked for, and I'm told we're going to get --

THE COURT: Privilege between whom?

MR. O'NEILL: The mother, who this was primarily for the mother, the children were there some of the time for

counseling. So it's joint counseling amongst the children and with the mother.

We've talked to the therapist. And what the therapist has said that he can get for us, and we've asked him to get for us, is his, in his words, heavily redacted notes that will show the parts that relate specifically to the daughters where they are involved in some part. He is the one who told us, and I agree with him, that he cannot produce without authorization from the mother, who has no interest in giving it, the records of her work that she did in connection with the therapy.

Privileges exist to block the flow of information.

THE COURT: Well, have you turned that over yet?

MR. O'NEILL: No, we don't have it yet, Judge.

We're getting it from him. If we could find a record, all the records going back to childhood, anything we can find we'll turn over. We've asked our client. We've worked with the client. We'll continue to do so. We're not trying to hide any information. I've never hidden any information in my life. I'm not about to start now.

THE COURT: Well, it is kind of curious, frankly, that the suit's been filed two years and you are still trying to find information. I mean, you must have had some before you filed suit.

MR. O'NEILL: We didn't have any medical records

before we filed suit, Judge. No. We didn't have any medical records. We did request some, but we haven't had any luck in getting virtually anything. There is a physician that she's seeing, excuse me, I think it's a, I many be wrong on this one, Dr. Jere, J-e-r-e, who has given us a summary. And we said a summary doesn't count, we need the records, get us the records.

So he's down in Dallas, she, excuse me, down in Dallas. I expect we'll have those sooner than later. I would be happy to have an order from the Court, if you want to give us an order that says, and I'll stick to the dates, you have to produce this information by, let's say, January 30th, because it would be of some help to me in getting some momentum and getting pieces like that done and out of the way.

But, otherwise, I can't produce what doesn't exist. I mean, whether or not defense counsel feels it's not credible is not the issue with respect to it.

Now, I heard something said there that I scratched my head when it was first stated, all this about how text messages, there are no texts, no e-mails, no Facebook, and these people are on it all the time. Well, some people are. Some people are not. But in the same breath a few minutes later, just as I was scratching that down I heard, but they've turned over all these redacted pages related to

Facebook. There is one text that she has that she provided that relates to this. We turned it over.

The Facebook is redacted. There's no question. She doesn't have to put her entire life, anyone does, so it's the equivalent of going through say I want to see all the mail, physical mail you've received over this period of time.

She used search terms. She went back through and searched through it. I personally looked at every one of those and made decisions about whether or not it was something that fell within the scope. And if in doubt I said, yes, and we turned it over.

The problem with things like Facebook is you take a look at something and you say, well, there's got to be something missing here. And there may be, but digitally it's not there. It doesn't exist.

We've turned over, I want to say, over a hundred pages of documents relating to Facebook postings and comments that she's gotten. I've put them so that if there is a comment that she has made in any context they get what was said from someone else so that the information is there and it's available.

We have done our best to and will continue to try to go ahead and provide the information that's sought. We can't produce that which does not exist.

Let's see if there's something, there was one other thing. Things like, they must exist somewhere. Well, they don't must exist somewhere. They don't exist at least we've been able to find it. If we can find it, Judge, we'll either do one of two things. Either we'll turn it over or we'll identify it to the other side if there is a reason why it would not be produced. And I have in mind sometimes I've gotten in medical records that are wholly unrelated to the subject, but identified to the other side and said, if you want to file a motion to compel do so. I don't think that will be necessary here because I don't think we're going to turn up anything that falls into that category. But if it exists I'm glad to find it, glad to go ahead and turn it over.

We need to get back to them with respect to other people as to whom she thinks she may have discussed this. The Facebook postings are of some help with respect to it, but it's a broad scope of people and we'll try to add to what that is, but I don't think there's any more to add. That's essentially our position, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Judge?

MR. JUDGE: Your Honor, briefly. Again, with all due respect to plaintiff's counsel, if -- I just, I can't believe that no one in plaintiff's family can remember who her childhood pediatrician was. And if she had more than

one that no one in her family can remember who they were.

Problem number two, we have asked the plaintiff to give us a signed authorization so that we can chase down the records. The plaintiff refuses to do that.

I've been doing this for 20, 23 years, Your Honor. And my experience is if you ask a hospital for a record or you ask a doctor's office for a record and it's old and it's a lot of work to dig through the files and find it, they tell you they don't exist. If you pursue them they do eventually appear.

Now, in the case of Ms. Lewis, if she was on Dr. Dinosaur Medicaid may have the records. If she was on Blue Cross Blue Shield they may have the records. Her mother may still have some of the records in her own personal files. The idea that this girl from age four to 21 is a blank slate medically it's not feasible, Your Honor.

Dr. Laflure is, I believe, no, excuse me, Dr.

Roberts is the current therapist she has seen. She has been seeing that therapist since March of 2015, five months after this lawsuit was filed.

What we have from Dr. Laflure, excuse me, Dr. Jones, is only a summary of his interpretation of the notes he took of her treatment. We should be entitled to the notes at least.

THE COURT: I think he said he was going to get

1 them. 2 MR. O'NEILL: Yeah, absolutely. 3 MR. JUDGE: What I thought I heard him say was 4 that they were going to be redacted. But if he's going to 5 get the full notes that's fine. 6 MR. O'NEILL: No, we'll get -- we made it clear 7 that that summary is not acceptable. We want the full 8 notes. 9 MR. JUDGE: And as for the Facebook thing, Your 10 Honor, or the Instagram thing or text messaging or e-mails 11 or G-mails or Google mail, Instagram, whatever, we've been 12 given, as of two days ago, three days ago, a handful of 13 heavily redacted messages back and forth between her and her sister and her brother K.J., Keith Lewis, Junior. 14 15 We, you can't tell that those are from Facebook. 16 Everything is redacted except a shorthand full of notes that 17 the plaintiff has decided are relevant. Where's the rest of 18 the Facebook page? Where is the rest of these notes? 19 what was the basis for the redaction? There was no 20 privilege log submitted. So, you know, you might have to 21 say that they've given us her Facebook page. That's not 22 true. 23 We have no e-mails whatsoever. None. And we have 24 no texts whatsoever. We have essentially no social media

We think that we should be given access to her

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whatsoever.

Facebook page.

The notes that we got yesterday or two days ago include a note back and forth between her and one of her friends in which she said, oh, I'm about to file a lawsuit, And this was January 2014, against those darn Jehovah's Witnesses. And the response that she got from her friend was, hey, you better turn your Facebook page private. And the very next thing from Annessa to her friend was, oh, that's a good idea. I'm going to do that now.

Why should we suddenly be foreclosed from knowing what this woman's life was as she described it on Facebook suddenly because she files a lawsuit?

MR. O'NEILL: Judge, I'm not sure what planet we're on here. Turning a Facebook page private doesn't delete a thing. All it means is that it's limited as to who can see it. It doesn't mean that you can't -- the material is gone. You're hearing things, to be direct, certainly not true.

For example, there was an instance, and I forgot about this one, excuse me for going back to it, where she hasn't produced the diary. We know there's at least one diary. We identified the diary. We said there was a diary she kept. And it's the name of a website that keeps diaries. And she, in 2012, before we ever got within a mile of this, decided she didn't want it, she didn't want it seen

so she cut off the account.

We said to her, okay, what you need to do is go back to them and see if they still have it. Do they still have it archived. She's trying to do that. We're trying to locate it. We're not saying it doesn't exist.

As it relates to the pediatrician, she has different medical practices that she thinks that she went to. Her life was chaotic. So she went to various practices. She thinks she knows who she went to. We've tried to locate each of those practices. We're trying to chase them down. We contact them. They have no records. They don't have anything. Maybe it's because they don't exist, maybe it's because she didn't go there. We'll give the names to the other side. They can subpoena those practices, which is the best way to do it --

THE COURT: Why not give them an authorization?

MR. O'NEILL: Because I've seen authorizations be abused, Your Honor. And if the Court wants us to give an authorization the only request I have with respect to it is that it be addressed to a specific practice. In other words, if we can identify a practice or through any other method that's possible to where if they say, we want one for a particular practice, I'm glad to get them an authorization directed to that specific practice.

I just am concerned about authorizations for my

1 client's medical records being misused in some respect. 2 THE COURT: Well, how are they going to be 3 misused? MR. O'NEILL: Well, because they could, for 4 5 example, request gynecological records, that sort of thing. 6 Those aren't relevant in any way to these proceedings. 7 mean, it's this suggestion that, you know, we have got 8 heavily redacted Facebook, we don't have any e-mail, those 9 Facebook postings, from what I can see, are not Facebook 10 postings. They are all e-mail. Entirely e-mail within 11 Facebook. 12 They got one text. The only text that 13 exists that is referenced specifically in the material that 14 we turned over. We're turning over the material. 15 Facebook material is chaotic. From what I can gather, and I 16 haven't been on Facebook in two years, it's the nature of 17 Facebook. 18 I've looked at some of these. I've seen the whole 19 I can see the date, I can see the time, I can see the 20 sequence going through and they just don't flow necessarily. 21 But the fact that she, that this is the nature of what it 22 is, if the question was, okay, we want to see every letter 23 you've written and received since, pick a date, January 1, 24 2000 just to pick one out of the air, Your Honor wouldn't 25 order that. You wouldn't say she has to turn everything

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     that she's corresponded about.
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               What you would say legitimately is that she has to
     turn over all the references that relate to her mental
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    health, that relate to sexual abuse, that relate to
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     Jehovah's Witnesses.
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               I've gone through those. I had a paralegal go
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     through them. Highlighted, took a look and said, what do we
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    have here. We've turned over anything at all that relates
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     to it. It's the nature of the beast that it's going to be
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     somewhat chaotic. There just isn't any way around it. But
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     we have turned over the material. We'll continue to turn
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     over the material. This isn't hide the ball. I don't like
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     that.
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               THE COURT: Well, I think it's time that I do give
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    you an order and that is to respond to their requests by the
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     end of this month. And that means getting the names of
17
     doctors, any, if it's the Facebook page that they are
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     looking for, I'm not familiar with Facebook myself, but --
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               MR. O'NEILL: It speaks well of you.
20
               THE COURT: Pardon me?
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               MR. O'NEILL: It speaks well of you.
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               THE COURT: And any of the other issues. Frankly,
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     it seems to me incredulous that you don't have some of this
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     information now, two years after the lawsuit.
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                             I understand, Your Honor.
               MR. O'NEILL:
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And we're trying to move this along. It's getting bogged down like some other cases I've got that, you know, by the time I retire it may be another judge who is going to hear this case. MR. O'NEILL: I don't really disagree about the substance of what the Court is saying at all, Your Honor. We have been diligent. We'll continue to. I appreciate the end of the month. We will continue to pursue them. diligent about it ourselves. And we'll be even more so. And I appreciate the order because it gives me the opportunity to say, for example, to the doctor in Dallas, look, I've got a federal judge telling me your redacted document doesn't do it, give me the whole thing. THE COURT: Right. MR. O'NEILL: I'm grateful for that. MR. JUDGE: Your Honor, let me talk a little bit about a signed medical authorization. So what we're hearing is, you know, Mr. Judge, if my client can remember a particular medical practice that she went to, geese, you know, I call them up and they tell me they have no records so what else do you want? What if she can't remember a medical practice or a hospital or something that she went to, if we give them a subpoena with an authorization and we get records low and behold in the Bellows Falls area.

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Saying that we can -- Mr. Judge, you can just
serve subpoenas on the people that we've identified.
haven't identified anyone to us. And you've already told us
that the people that you can remember don't have any
         And, three, we're not going to give you signed
medical records authorization anyway. No one is going to
produce records without a signed medical authorization, Your
Honor.
          THE COURT: Well, he said he's going to for those
that can be identified. He has identified any, as you said.
So --
          MR. O'NEILL: Well, we have identified some,
       We have identified some. And we've used
authorizations to try and obtain the records. In this one
instance, Dr. Timme, who they would like to take the
deposition of to verify when her records were destroyed, she
wants an authorization from our client. We said, fine, no
problem, so that she can be deposed.
          Anybody they want to depose, if they want a
specific authorization for that provider glad to give it to
       It's no hardship.
them.
          THE COURT: Go ahead.
                     We need to know who they are in order
          MR. JUDGE:
to get an authorization.
          THE COURT:
                      Right.
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So do we. 1 MR. O'NEILL: 2 THE COURT: Well, he's going to do that. MR. O'NEILL: It's the best we can do. 3 4 THE COURT: By the end of the month. 5 MR. LYNN: And, Judge, we've got our own motion, 6 but to the extent -- this goes beyond the instant motion. 7 Then the question becomes, all right, so when do we finally 8 get the information that we're entitled to so that we can 9 take the deposition of the plaintiff in Vermont. 10 Now, I know that's an issue, right. We've been 11 told from the outset until yesterday that that deposition 12 has to take place in Texas. We now, I think, have agreement 13 that that's going to take place in Vermont, but if not I 14 want that issue decided now so we don't have to come back 15 and bother Your Honor again with whether a plaintiff filing 16 in Vermont around issues that happened in Vermont has to 17 come to Vermont for a deposition. 18 MR. O'NEILL: Judge, we've always found ways to 19 work our way through these kind of issues. I haven't said, 20 that no, it has to happen in Texas. Yes, it can happen in 21 Vermont. 22 For example, let's assume for purposes of 23 conversation that they --THE COURT: If she filed the lawsuit here in 24 25 Vermont she's going to come here. If they want her to come

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     here she'll come here.
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               MR. O'NEILL: So be it. Understood.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay?
               MR. O'NEILL: Absolutely. My suggestion about it
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     to the other side was, and I understand the Court's order
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     with respect to it if that's what it's to be, if they were
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     going to be down there doing some other depositions we could
 8
     do it there. If they want to do it here we'll bring her
 9
     here. No problem.
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               THE COURT: All right. That resolves that.
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
12
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. JUDGE:
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               THE COURT:
                           So, let's get all that, all those
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     names together by the end of the month and provide
15
     authorizations to the defendants for those people that you
16
     identify. And, you know, move it along. I mean, this is
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     getting to be a little much, frankly. I don't want to hear
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     any more of these motions.
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                           I agree, Your Honor. And in light of
               MR. JUDGE:
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     what has just taken place, I think we're going to have to
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     extend the current discovery schedule.
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                           That's what I was going to discuss
               THE COURT:
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     next.
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               MR. STOREY: Your Honor, before we move on to
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     that?
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1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. STOREY: You have indicated that you don't 3 want to hear any more of these motions. Just, as a matter 4 of where we are, there had been a subpoena to Christian 5 Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses. And they indicated 6 they had six or seven documents on a privilege log. 7 assume it's all of the same things the Court just heard and 8 we may be able to work that out amongst ourselves. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. STOREY: But it's possible that that would be 11 an issue. And there's another subpoena to congregation, 12 another congregation that also has a couple of documents. 13 So some of these issues are going to come back up. 14 I'm just making the Court aware of it. 15 All right. But, I mean, we may not THE COURT: 16 have another hearing because, frankly, if it's the same sort 17 of argument that's being made then we'll decide it on the 18 papers. 19 MR. STOREY: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor. 20 That's fine with us, Judge. MR. O'NEILL: 21 THE COURT: All right. So I'm not sure we can 22 work out this discovery order now, but it certainly, looking 23 at it before I came on the bench, it's, there's no way you 24 can comply with some of these things. 25 So what I will do is, hopefully I'll be able to

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get out an order about the discovery issues. I'm not going
     to do anything about your request, Mr. Judge, because I
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     think I dealt with it. I hope that ends it. But as far as
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     the other motions we'll try to get an order out, what's
     today, Tuesday, by the end of the week certainly.
               So, then you'll have an idea of what I'm ordering.
     I'm going to tell you ahead of time, however, that the order
 8
     will include the confidentiality agreement that's ordered by
 9
     the Court. So knowing that, I would order that that
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     agreement by the parties be submitted to the Court by the
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     15th of this month. And then that should, in connection
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     with my order, should at least move along the discovery as
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     far as the opposition so far.
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               So, let's see, so that deals with requests in
     discovery at this point. I don't know if there's going to
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16
     be more discovery, but it's, I believe it says that -- no,
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                  It doesn't mention when actually the discovery
     it doesn't.
18
     is supposed to be answered. But you've got, for instance,
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     depositions taking place in November of last year.
20
     those didn't take place.
21
                          You're correct, Your Honor.
               MR. LYNN:
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               THE COURT: Have there been any depositions?
23
                          No, Judge.
               MR. LYNN:
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               MR. STOREY: No, Your Honor. There have been two
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     or three, Your Honor.
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                          I'm sorry, two, Your Honor of the
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    paleographers.
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               THE COURT: The what?
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Paleographers.
                           Oh. All right. So, well, I think
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               THE COURT:
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     that probably the parties ought to sit down and figure out
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     what you can, how you can modify this. Because for me to
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     try to go through it at this point is probably --
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               MR. O'NEILL: I was going to suggest, Judge, that
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     we can work through this.
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               THE COURT: All right. So --
                          I expect so, Your Honor.
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               MR. LYNN:
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               THE COURT: -- why don't you submit that order by
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     the 15th as well.
15
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. LYNN:
16
               THE COURT: All right?
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               MR. LYNN:
                          Yes.
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               THE COURT: And hopefully it won't carry this case
19
     into the next century.
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               MR. JUDGE: At the risk of doing exactly that,
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     Your Honor, can I just raise one minor point, which is, for
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     clarification purposes, on the Court's order from the bench
23
     on our motion to compel.
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               THE COURT:
                           Yes.
25
                           Can we clarify that that include her
               MR. JUDGE:
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1 entire Facebook page, please? 2 MR. O'NEILL: Absolutely not, Your Honor. I mean, 3 this is, it is the equivalent of going back in someone's 4 life and saying, I want all of your correspondence that goes 5 back over a period of time. There are things that are 6 relevant and they are entitled to those. I'm glad to give 7 them to them. No hesitancy. But turning over everything 8 that exists with respect to one's life, if we're going to 9 deal with that issue, I really would like to brief that 10 issue because I think the law's completely to the contrary 11 with respect to it. If the Court would even entertain it I 12 would really like to brief the issue. 13 THE COURT: Well, I'm not prepared to order that 14 her -- see I'm not familiar, frankly, with Facebook. 15 don't know what's there and what isn't. Whether it goes 16 back to whenever you started the page. 17 Facebook goes back to 2004. And we MR. JUDGE: 18 assume this woman probably started a Facebook page in 2008 19 or some -- she was in college from 2008 to 2012. Every 20 college kid has a Facebook page. 21 What she -- what her -- hundreds of friends are 22 allowed to know about her life. And everyone in her family 23 is on her Facebook page. Why is that excluded from us, the

THE COURT: Well, I expect the argument is there

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defendants in this case?

1 are certain privacy matters. 2 MR. JUDGE: A privacy that she's disseminating to 3 potentially hundreds of people? THE COURT: Well, not, not certainly about any 4 5 issues in this case, but --6 MR. JUDGE: Well, I'll give you an example, only 7 because Your Honor says that he's not terribly familiar with 8 Facebook, and I can understand that. Facebook users post -the typical Facebook user posts on a daily or a weekly basis 9 10 what they've been up to. This is what I did today, I went 11 horseback riding. Here's a picture of me on the horse. 12 Whatever. 13 How is that not relevant to her claim that her 14 life has been destroyed by an incident in 1991, '92 and '93? 15 MR. O'NEILL: Your Honor, we all have moments of 16 difficulty in our lives. We all have moments of going well. 17 The fact that someone is having a good time riding a horse, 18 I don't think she rides a horse, doesn't mean that she's not damaged in some respect. 19 20 The same way going back through someone's life and 21 looking through letters that they may have written that 22 talks about parts of their lives. Discovery that's relevant 23 here should be provided. The pages, the e-mail messages 24 back and forth on Facebook we have provided with respect to 25 But it doesn't mean that there has to be a wholesale it.

invasion of someone's life.

She isn't saying this destroyed her life. She's married. She has a child. She has a job. She's going through life and dealing with it. She's got difficult issues. We're prepared and have provided anything that relates to the childhood sexual abuse or the Jehovah's Witnesses has been brought forth. And if we find something more we'll bring it forth. We'll try to get the diaries that I indicated, for example.

MR. JUDGE: Here's the problem, Your Honor. When they say we'll produce anything from her Facebook page that talks about abuse or that talks about Jehovah's Witnesses, they omit everything in her life that is relevant that doesn't talk about abuse or Jehovah's Witnesses.

A Facebook page is the modern equivalent of anyone whose under the age of 50, or whatever, of a diary of your life. That is relevant. And if Your Honor is not prepared to order it now then I want to brief that issue on why the Court should order her to turn that over.

THE COURT: Well, what do you have now?

MR. O'NEILL: What I have right now, Judge, is we have -- Facebook, as I was involved in it, what I get has basically two components essentially. One is what people post to there all the time on their public page or their private page. They can limit who sees it, however they want

to go about it.

And then there are e-mails, think of it as texting, if you will, that people use within Facebook to communicate with other people.

What we have done is, we asked her to go through, and she did searches using various search terms that would indicate anything to do with, for example, sexual abuse, the Jehovah's Witnesses, mental health issues, those kinds of things.

And if they want us -- if they've got some more terms they want us to use I'm glad to use those to search.

The search found those and they are actually showing up highlighted in the material that we've turned over.

So all of those e-mails, if you will, I think that's a fair way to describe them, that relate in any way to this in a broad sense, we have produced. So those we have turned over. So we --

THE COURT: So, what about the first part you talked about?

MR. O'NEILL: I don't think there's anything there that relates to it, Judge, but I will double back check with her to make sure.

In fact, what I'll do is I will ask her for us to have an authorization so we can take a look through it. So that way there isn't any confusion with respect to what it

is.

We'll take a look at it ourselves and go back through and see what's there.

THE COURT: So you don't even have that at all?

MR. O'NEILL: No, I don't typically ask the

clients for access to it, but I will ask her for access to

it and see what's there. If there is something that is

germane in some respect, falls within the scope of discovery

as defined here we'll turn it over.

MR. JUDGE: And we will want to know in connection with that, and certainly an order in connection with that, whether, when she filed this lawsuit in October 1st, 2014, or going back to when her notes say that she was about to file this lawsuit in January 2014, have you deleted anything from your Facebook page and don't delete anything from your Facebook page.

But, Your Honor, my basic position is that the plaintiff should not get to decide from the diary, the online diary of plaintiff's life that only the few messages or days when she's having a bad day and she's blaming it on the Jehovah's Witnesses only that's relevant to us. No. For the 10 bad days that she has according to her Facebook page and the thousand good days that she has, both are relevant.

THE COURT: Well, first, what I would order is

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     that you obtain, either on your own or through her, the
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     Facebook page, which I guess includes not e-mails and so
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     forth, but what she posts, right?
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               MR. O'NEILL: True. And what other people post on
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     it, Judge.
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               THE COURT: What other people post.
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               MR. O'NEILL:
                             Sure.
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               THE COURT: And either provide that to counsel,
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     which I think you probably don't want to do, or provide it
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     to the Court for an in-camera inspection and I'll determine,
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     frankly, whether all or some of it should be turned over.
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               MR. O'NEILL:
                             Sure.
13
               THE COURT: All right?
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               MR. O'NEILL: Absolutely.
15
               THE COURT: So let's do that by the 30th.
16
               MR. O'NEILL: Should not be a problem, Judge.
17
     only -- I might have to ask for a little latitude on that
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    because sometimes getting it out of Facebook can be an
19
     issue.
            Let's leave it at the 30th and if there's a problem
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     we'll come back to the Court. We'll work very hard so that
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     it's not an issue. Shouldn't be.
22
               THE COURT: All right. Okay. That it? Okay.
23
               So, again, submit the confidentiality order by the
24
     15th. And also a revised discovery order. And then the
25
    plaintiff is going to turn over, do what I ordered by the
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30th.
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            Okay?
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               MR. STOREY: Thank you, Your Honor.
               MR. LYNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MR. JUDGE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MR. O'NEILL: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               (The Court recessed at 12:54 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE I, Anne Marie Henry, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court, for the District of Vermont, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of the taped proceedings in the aforementioned matter to the best of my skill and ability. anne Marie Henry Anne Marie Henry, RPR Official Court Reporter